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A distributed le repository is described It supports interaction be
tween dierent machines used by a single user as well as between
users that share data Files can be replicated and consistency will be
maintained or les can be shipped copied to a remote site
As with more traditional systems the servers are trusted not to
leak information However the r	ole servers play is not as much the
hub in the system In particular users are in charge of delegating
acccess to les For 
exibility delegations might take place outside of
the realm of the system proper by any means available to the users
Users can delegate access rights to local and remote users including
remote users in other domains ACLs are used to maintain local access
control capabilities are used to access remote les These capabilities
are valid within epochs but are immediately revoked when being used
thus being valid atmostonce
In essence we have realized a 
exible infrastructure where users
can implement their own security policy
  Introduction
Traditional systems such as Kerberos Kohl and Neuman  are built
around a systemmodel that in our view no longer holds It is simply not true
that 	clients
 are solely placed in laboratories and that users are dependent
on servers in order to work Powerful workstations and laptop computers
have forced a shift in focus Servers are still useful but their role have
changed this fact should be reected in the way supporting infrastructure

is designed In particular policy decisions are to a much greater extent
made by users Also communication channels outside the system proper
must be acknowledged in the sense that users can exploit such channels
when possible or desired For example in Kerberos there is no way a user
can grant others access to any of his les without interacting with Kerberos
except by giving away his password Or put in another way the system
model does not include enough trust in users to reign over his own les
When on the other hand users are placed in the center of the computing
model new challenges must be solved In this paper it will be shown that
regarding users as 	rst class citizens
 have profound security implications
In particular users might delegate authority ie grant access to his les by
means of his personal computers without interacting with the servers that
actually stores the les Enforcing security policy now becomes an issue
of implementing the users policy In this respect our system is concerned
with the proper handling of delegation in concert with replication
This paper describes our system with focus on how secure delegation
of access is designed and implemented Section  gives an overview of the
system the design rationale and some examples of its use We focus on
security by describing the setting where delegation takes place and the
obstacles our solution overcomes Then in Section  we cover the machinery
put in place to enable delegations across administrative domains Section 
analyzes the protocols described in the previous section In Section  we
discuss our work Finally a conclusion is given in Section 
 System overview
Users have a wealth of extrasystem information Such information range
from well dened messages such as 	Bob is away for the weekend
 to more
subtle and uncertain knowledge about the habits of colleagues It is hard if
not impossible to compile such knowledge into a form that can be utilized
by systems Humans on the other hand are able to consider the implica
tions and act accordingly For example if Bob is away for the weekend
he will most certainly not edit any les In other words if Alice shares
some les with Bob she can most probably alter them without taking any
steps to protect herself against any consistency problems Furthermore
users normally have access to communication channels outside the system
proper channels that can overcome network partitions telephone is the
prime example
We have designed and implemented a system that is exible enough to
accommodate extrasystem communication while at the same time main
taining consistency on the data entrusted to it Allowing users exibility

has been our foremost goal We also acknowledge that a contemporary dis
tributed system is not homogenous Hence one can not assume that all
users will run one particular operating system Thus the interface to our
system is not an API but rather a protocol The protocol called FRTP
File Repository Transport Protocol see below for details is designed with
exibility in mind
We now briey describe our system our research vehicle as it were We
then outline the main theme of this paper the means to delegate access to
les to users in other administrative domains
  File Repository
We have designed and implemented a distributed le repository FR Ba
sically FR stores les and information about les and is implemented by
servers Users run clients on their machines and communicate with FR over
some network One server is able support many users With a suitable front
end users can store and retrieve les The server maintains state concerning
the whereabouts of les who has copies on which machines which version
is current and who was granted locks when locks expire and so on Notice
however that FR does not provide the functionality of traditional source
control systems such as RCS or SCCS FR is meant to provide storage that
users utilize from whatever application they might be using No under
standing of any leformats is built into FR and the object for replication
is whole les For the same reason if the logical scope of some datum con
tains more than one le it is the responsibility of the client software run
by the user to operate on all these les in concert
FR supports replication  Servers will maintain consistency between the
replicas by means of a servertoserver protocol Moxnes  this protocol
is based on twophase commit There are thus two regimes for interaction
in the system The rst labeled 	
 in Figure a is between users and
their local FR server The other labeled 	
 in the gure is the inter
server communication required for replication usually over WANs This
communication is outside the 	reach
 of users in the sense that when a le
is replicated the FR will exhibit best eort to keep all replicas consistent
Furthermore les can also be shipped from one FR server to another
site by a particular variant of the replication machinery Shipping les has
two applications First when the right to access a le is delegated to a user
situated at some other site the le can be shipped to that site Second
 The term copy has to do with distribution in space while version implies changes
over time Replication ensures that all copies of a le has the same version and a replica



























Figure  Two views on FR
before departure to a remote site a user can delegate to herself in the role
of visitor at a remote site access to her own les In that way upon arrival
selected les will be present A typical rationale for shipping les is to ease
cooperation at the foreign site since all necessary les are available when
they are needed
FR is implemented as two distinct parts the front end FE and the
back end BE details of how FR is structured in shown in Figure b For
each client that connects to FR a new FE is started The FE and the client
interact by means of a custom designed protocol named FRTP Stabell
Kul  BE maintain the le store and communicate with the FEs
by means of Sun RPC Sun Microsystems Inc b FR is discussed at
length in StabellKul and Fallmyr 
   Security in FR
To maintain security some type of access control is needed FR uses two
of the most widely used security models access control lists ACLs and
capabilities Both models have their merits in that ACLs implement some
centralized control and support administrative activities better while capa
bilities can be easily forwarded to a subserver as an authorization to carry
out a task Gong  In FR ACLs are used for local access control while
capabilities are used for remote access control This paper is only concerned
with remote delegations ie focus will be on capabilities
Access to FR is granted to users that can present valid credentials Or
to be precise commands are accepted on channels that by means of cre
dentials are asserted to speak for a user Such credentials include a valid
certicate issued by the system administrator Normally users are repre

sented by a public key that 	speaks for them
 Lampson et al 
Users may delegate authority to others at will This paper considers
authority in the form of the ability to access a le How the delegate is
to be authenticated is a concern of the delegator not FR the mechanisms
to ensure this will be discussed That is when the owner of a le issues
a certicate he has the sole responsibility for ensuring that the certicate
is in accordance with his own security policy FR merely veries that the
credentials supplied with the certicate is sucient
The setting we will consider is one with two users A and B They
reside on two dierent sites possibly separated by a WAN Both A and B is
supported by their respective local FR server SA and SB The problem we
will consider is twofold First A wants to delegate to B authority to read
some le stored at SA How can this be accomplished on some extra system
channel Second revocation must be possible
In FR the trusted computing base TCB varies in that individual users
might in part choose their own Such a view is consistent with a design
strategy placing the user and his equipment in focus The local FR server
must be included in the TCB if FR is to be useful However FR is only
included in the TCB when we consider the les stored there Users are free
to use whatever client they want This is in contrast to Kerberos where
there are no such choices and the users must have the complete system in
their TCB all or nothing
  Related work
As previously stated Kerberos puts all trust in a TTP which we have
deliberately avoided in our realization of a personal computing environment
The delegation model in FR is based on CAP Helme  with the
main dierence being that we extended CAP to support delegations in a
multidomain environment Also CAP which was inspired by ICAP Gong
 is a capabilityonly system and thus make no use of ACLs
DSSA Gasser et al  and SESAME McMahon  are two sys
tems that were designed to be used in a multidomain environment and
unlike Kerberos they both use publickey cryptography and certicate au
thorities CAs They dier in the way they use security servers DSSA uses
oline security servers SESAME provides online security servers Some
disadvantages of both oline and online security servers are given in Ash
ley and Broom  Here some disadvantages of oline servers seem to
be
  Management of change  since there are several copies of certicates
it is dicult to change security information and revocation is slow

  Lack of condentiality  user identities and privilege information are
readable for all
And online servers seem to have some of the following disadvantages
  Availability  if a server becomes unavailable the system may come
to a complete stop since authentication and access control may not be
possible
  Compromise  since online servers may store secrets of entities com
promise of the server may be catastrophic
  Attacks  online servers may be attacked through the network
Thus the main advantage of online servers is being able to handle fast
revocations while oline servers seem more secure in that they are more
dicult to attack and compromise
 Secure Delegation
This section is concerned with the design of the delegation mechanism
First the overall strategy is described then the representation of users
certicates and messages We end this section by giving some implementa
tion details and describe some performance results
 Setting
The principals involved in a delegation are two users A and B and both are
assumed to be represented by their public key Being represented by a public
key involves a delegation in itself the details are discussed in Section  In
our setting each user has access to a local server SA and SB respective
The common case would be for A and SA to be situated at one site while B
and SB would be at another However no assumptions are made regarding
connectivity
Assume that A wants to give B access to a le of his He would construct
a certicate and hand it to B The certicate includes information about A
B and the le the certicate is encoded in SDSI Rivest and Lampson 
and thus in ASCII and can be sent in an email the format of certicates is
discussed in Section  B hands the certicate to his server SB which will
fetch the le from As server SA
While designing the delegation protocol we had two overall modes of
operation to choose from either push or pull As seen in Figure  a push












Figure  The push and pull protocols
the remote server A pullprotocol on the other hand requires the delegate
B to pull the le after receiving a delegation certicate from A Another
dierence between these two protocols is that the pushprotocol requires A
to be online when issuing the delegation while A may be oline with the
pullprotocol
We have chosen as described earlier a pullprotocol A side eect is
that an explicit acceptance of the delegation can be implemented With a
pushprotocol a denial of service attack is possible A le could have been
shipped even if it was not wanted ooding the receiver We believe the
higher complexity of the pullprotocol does not detract from these important
factors in our choice
If the access granted is a write access more protocol machinery is needed
in order to ship the le back to the original server This writebackprotocol
is essentially the pushprotocol in gure  with B initiating the protocol to
the local server SB using the delegation certicate from A Note that As
local server would now know because of the delegation certicate that A
expects a le
If a user wants a delegation certicate revoked a revoke command can
be issued to the local server Revocation is also provided in that delega
tion certicates have onceonly semantics which means that a delegation
certicate can only be used atmostonce by the acceptor B
  Protocol description
In this section we will describe the protocols that realize the delegation
across domains
The rst message is the delegation certicate denoted Ca and is sent
from A to B The goal is to transfer the certicate
Message  A  B   fAB SB SA FIa FAb TagK  
A

Here FIa is the le identicator a le name FAb is a description of the
access rights A want to delegate to B and Ta is a timestamp generated to
make the message unique and thus assure freshness  we will return to how
this timestamp is used in Section  This message is 	outside
 the rest of
the protocol in that it does not matter how the certicate is transported it
may be through email encrypted or not through telefax or even through
ordinary mail This means that FR is not involved when the certicate
is actually issued The important factor is that B is able to represent it
digitally before proceeding with the protocol
When time has come B initiates actions by asking his local server to
retrieve the le
Message  B  SB   fB SB Ca TbNbgK  
B
The certicate Ca is handed to SB in order for SA to make an access control
decision
On behalf of B the server SB will contact SA




The certicate Ca is sent to SA through SB Then SA makes an access
control decision based on the content of Ca see Section  If authorization
is granted the le is sent to SB Notice the implicit delegation to the new
principal SB for B We return to the dierent principals in Section 
If As server nds that the credentials are sucient the le is sent to SB
Message  SA   SB   ffSA SB FIa FACa  FNSBgK  
SA
gKSB
The le is encrypted to prevent disclosure
Finally B is notied that the le has been shipped
Message  SB   B   fSB B FACa  HF NbgK  
SB
The sixth and last message is semantically part of the protocol even
though it is done separately How B and SB interacts to transfer the le is
outside the scope of the protocol that ensures delegation
Message  SB   B   F
Although we use certicates with onceread and oncewrite access we
need to specify a protocol for sending the le F back to SA We have specied
the following writebackprotocol




Message  SA   SB   fSA SB ACCaNB   gK  
SA

The rst message sends the original certicate issued by A along with the
modied le The message is encrypted to prevent disclosure SA checks
the certicate updates the le if write access was granted and replies
with ACCa which says if the writeback was accepted or denied This
writebackprotocol occurs by a request from B to SB which is outside this
protocol
 Implementation
Public keys are used to authenticate users in FR Keypairs are created
externally with the application Pretty Good Privacy PGP Zimmermann
 and we have written software for using PGP keys in FR to create and
verify digital signatures as well as encrypt and decrypt session keys We
have also written software for handling delegation certicates using SDSI
 Sexpressions Both our PGPlibrary and our SDSIlibrary rely on the
cryptolibrary SSLeay for processing encryption and decryption tasks
as well as handling large integers
All keys are stored in the BE of FR public keys may be transported to a
FE by requests where the FE may do verication and encryption operations
the secret key is only handled by the BE who do all signature and decryption
operations
We have means to delegate access rights on les locally within a do
main and throughout multidomains we extended FR with a change acl
command to delegate access rights locally within a domain and throughout
multidomains delegation certicates are issued and used An example of an
actual delegation certicate Ca is shown in Figure  Here we have used
emailaddresses to identify the issuer the acceptor as well as the servers
but these identiers may be any PGP UIDs a name ngerprint of a public
key etc The delegated le is identied as hostsitedomainpathtole
FR provides two commands that implements the pull and writeback
protocols for the acceptor B may use the retrieve command to retrieve the
delegated le from SA the writeback command is used to ship the le back
to SA
Certicate revocation lists CRLs are used for revocation to prevent
replays of onceonly delegation certicates and for revoking existing dele
gation certicates To revoke existing certicates we implemented an epoch
command which explicit tells FR that all certicates issued before this epoch
is no longer valid for this le Thus a delegation certicate is only valid
within the existing epoch This epoch command also prevents CRLs from




( SDSI-version: 1.0 )
‘( Delegate-To-Client: <ronnya@pasta.cs.uit.no> )
‘( Delegate-To-Server: <fradm@cs.uit.no> )
‘( Delegate-From-Client: <tage@acm.org> )
‘( Delegate-From-Server: <fradm@pasta.cs.uit.no> )
‘( Delegate-File: terje.pasta.cs.uit.no:/test )
‘( Delegate-ACL: read )
‘( Date: 1998-07-20T19:00:26.705+0200 )
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Figure  Example delegation certicate

Average Minimum Maximum
Insert   
Extract   
Table  Replication performance two replicas
Average Minimum Maximum
Pull   
Writeback   
Table  Performance of the pull and writebackprotocols
growing innitely
 Performance
FR has been implemented on FreeBSD and consists of approximately 
lines of source code in C a third being statements This does not include
the libraries that handles PGP keys SDSI certicates and other crypto
graphic tools
Our performance test setup consisted of three HewlettPackard Kayak
workstations running FreeBSD  on a LAN all workstations had dual
PIIMHz processors and  MB RAM each Two of these workstation
were used as servers running an FR server each one workstation was used
as a client
We measured the performance of a replicated le by using the insert
and extract commands and we also measured the performance of the pull
protocol and writeback The average times in seconds as well as minimum
and maximum times are shown in table  and table  The size of the
replicated and the delegated le were  KB
As seen inserting a le with two replicas used in average  sec
onds The extract command was substantially faster and spent in average
 seconds The pullprotocol however used  seconds in average The
writeback protocol was somewhat faster and spent in average  sec
onds
From this we can tell that the performance of reading and writing
operations on a replicated le is opposite to the performance of reading and
writing with delegation certicates With a replicated le writing is slower
with a delegated le reading is slower On the surface one might believe that
the pullprotocol command would perform better than the insert command

on a le with two replicas since no le content is sent from the client to the
server However with the pullprotocol more data are transfered between
servers since the le content is base encoded In addition the certicate
with the le content is encrypted These factors are probably the main
reasons for the worse performance results of the pullprotocol compared to
insert
 Analysis
This section will analyze the protocols previously specied including ana
lyzing both the delegation and the authentication parts of the pullprotocol
as well as analyzing the authentication parts of the writeback protocol
 The delegation
Although the BAN logic Burrows et al  is widely used for analyzing
authentication protocols it does not say anything about delegations We
can use the theory from Lampson et al  for this purpose
SA will only surrender a le F belonging to A to a principal B if B can
present credentials indicating that A wants the le to be surrendered That
is B must present to SA a certicate saying A says B access F
   We will
now show that the pullprotocol gives SA reason to believe that A intended
for B to obtain access to the le
S A explicitly mentioned B in the delegation certicate denoted at Mes
sage  see Section  The interpretation is that when B quotes A
he speaks for the compound principal B for A
Formally A says BjA B for A
S By mentioning SB in his certicate A acknowledges Bs request for
using an intermediate server If A had left out this principal B would
have had to contact SA directly The use of SB is for convenience only
Formally A says SBjB for A SB for B for A
S The credentials described above are signed together with the name F
of a le The interpretation is that the new authority granted to B
and SB is limited to this le
Formally A says B for A access F   
S When B in Message  signs the delegation certicate he accepts the
delegation
Formally BjA says BjA B for A

S The delegation made by A in S applies to B only when it is acknowl
edged B does that by including the name of SB in Message 
Formally BjA says SBjB for A SB for B for A
S Since F is mentioned in the certicate from A and B signs it he ac
knowledges that he will not try to use the authority for any other
purpose
Formally BjA says B for A access F   
S In S and S authority was delegated to SB it need to be acknowl
edged Message  achieves this
Formally SBjBjA says SBjB for A SB for B for A
S Finally SB uses his new authority obtained by S to ask for the le
Formally SBjBjA says B for A access F
  
In the analysis we use rules P D and P from Lampson et al
 Applied on statements S and S above we get
BjA B for A 
Likewise by applying the same rules on statements S S and S we get
SBjB for A SB for B for A 
This means that A has delegated authority to B who has accepted it and
that B for A has delegated authority to SB who also has accepted it Then
when SA retrieves statements SS S parses out as S and S because of
 and  To elaborate statement S means that
SB for B for A says B for A access F
  
And  means that SB is able to say so Then we have
B for A says B for A access F   
And since  means that B is able to say so we end up with
A says B access F   
Which is exactly the information SA needs in order to grant B through SB
access to the le F
The above analysis shows to which principals authority is delegated and
it shows that the messages support the conclusions The analysis assumes
that all messages are authenticated and reasonable fresh In the next
section we analyze the protocol to establish whether this is the case

  The pullprotocol
The previous section veried that the messages include information that
enables the participants to conclude that delegation has been properly au
thorized However the analysis assumes that the protocol ensures that all
messages are fresh and properly authenticated
In the analysis of authentication the BAN logic is used using the nota
tion from Burrows et al  First we specify our goals for the protocol
B should believe that A has delegated him access rights to a le then B
should believe that SA has granted the delegated access rights and B should
also believe that the delegated le is fresh
There are three sets of assumptions for the protocol the rst one contains




  A B believes
KSA





  SA B believes
KSB





  B SB believes
KSB





  SB SB believes
KSA










  A SB believes
KA
  A
These key beliefs tell that the dierent principals know their own public
keys as well as the public keys of the other principals participating in the
protocol None of them should be controversial
Assumptions about the jurisdiction beliefs
SA believes A controls Xb SB believes A controls Xb
B believes A controls Xb SB believes SA controls XSA
B believes SB believes SA controls XSA
Here B SB and SA believe that A has jurisdiction over the access rights
delegated with Xb and SB believes that SA has jurisdiction to construct a
response from this delegation In addition we have the weak assumption
that B believes that SB believes that SA has jurisdiction to construct a
response from Ca We need to include this assumption since B will never
see a message from SA which implies that B trusts SB when SB says that
there is a response from SA
Finally the last set of assumptions deal with freshness 
A believes freshTa B believes freshNb SB believes freshNSB
B believes freshTa SB believes freshTb SA believes freshTa

Now idealized the protocol can be specied as
Message  A  B   fXb TagK  
A










Message  SA   SB   ffXSA  FNSBgK  
SA
gKSB
Message  SB   B   fXSA  HF NbgK  
SB
Message  SB   B   F
First B receives Message  and from the public key messagemeaning
and nonceverication rules obtains
B believes A believes Xb
And from the jurisdiction rule B obtains
B believes Xb
Message  is similar toMessage  where now SB obtains from themessage
meanings nonceverication and jurisdiction rules
SB believes B believes Xb
SB believes A believes Xb
SB believes Xb
From Message  SA obtains from the same rules as applied above
SA believes B believes Xb
SA believes SB believes Xb
SA believes A believes Xb
SA believes Xb
With Message  we begin with the reply from SA and SB obtains
SB believes freshF
SB believes SA believes XSA
SB believes XSA
B then obtains from Message 	
B believes freshHF
B believes SB believes XSA
B believes SA believes XSA
B believes XSA

Finally with Message 
 and the hashing rule B obtains
B believes freshF
Which means that we have obtained our goals set for the protocol B now
believes that A has delegated B access rights Xb to a le F that SA has
fullled the access rights delegated XSA and that the le F is fresh
 The writebackprotocol




 Idealized the protocol can be specied as
Message  SB   SA   fffXb TagK  
A














By applying the messagemeaning nonceverication and jurisdiction




And with Message  SB obtains
SB believes XSA
The protocol concludes now that SB knows from XSA that SA has accepted
or denied Xb and F
 
 Use of timestamps
Some notes on the use of timestamps in the pullprotocol need to be made
Timestamps were rst introduced in Denning and Sacco  to prevent
replays of compromised keys as well as replacing a twostep handshake In
the latter case it is necessary to use synchronized clocks with the risks that
follows Gong  This means that the use of timestamps should be used
with care when is a timestamp fresh and are the clocks synchronized We
use timestamps two times in the pullprotocol in the certicate Ca and
once inMessage  B  SB The use in Ca is prudent since the timestamp
is used to make sure the certicate is not used before in which we check
all previous certicates used In Message  however it is used to to tell
SB that the message is fresh which SB may only verify if the clocks on Bs
computer and SBs computer are synchronized

It should be noted that our assumption B believes freshTa is rather
strong This is because timestamps in conjunction with freshness are usu
ally used to indicate that messages are recent Since both A and B are
users it may take some time between generating Ca to B receives it this
may take hours even days Also since there is no requirement for B to
store old certicates there is no way for B to be absolutely sure that Ca is
not used before A way to make sure that B believes Ca to be fresh would
be for B to send a nonce to A rst
Message 	 B  A   N  
b
Message  A  B   Ca
Where Ca includes the nonce N
 
b
as well But we still use our initial assump
tion B believes freshTa since delegation certicates are usually created
by requests from users who want the delegation Thus our argument is that
B will know that Ca is fresh by verifying that Ta is created after the initial
request from B to A This implies trust in loosely synchronized clocks
Also as stated in Burrows et al  what it is about timestamps that
causes users to believe they are fresh is outside the province of the BAN
logic Another argument is that even if Ta is not fresh and B believes it is
it will not have any catastrophic consequences since SA will later verify
that Ta is not fresh
 Discussion
A concern with the existing pullprotocol is that there is no way for B to
know that the le F given in Message 
 is the le F delegated by A
without trusting SA to give the proper le to SB and SB to give this le to
B This could be solved by putting the hash of the le in the delegation
certicate Ca but that would require A to be online when generating the
certicate The reason for this is that if A is oline he can not be certain
that F has not been changed since the last time he was online
The use of certicates with onceonly semantics has the implication that
a delegation certicate can not be replayed This seems better at prevent
ing misuse than the guaranteed phase described in Rivest  where
a certicate is denitely good until the expiration date The tradeo is
the overhead for users since new delegation certicates need to be gener
ated every time a delegation is needed But we believe that generating
certicates is cheap compared to the potential misuse of such certicates
The other reason for using certicates with onceonly semantics is that FR
was designed to support users who may be regularly disconnected and thus
have no means to issue an immediate revocation order to FR Helme 

The onceonly semantics assures that a delegation certicate will be used
atmostonce Note that the notion of onceonly semantics is not completely
new it is said that using electronic moneyeg spending it when running
a payperuse programis analogous to the revocation of a capability Yee

FR also supports chain of delegations where a delegated le may be
delegated by the original acceptor to another user again A ag could have
been included in the delegation certicate that said if A would like the le
F to be included in such a chain of delegations However FR has no means
to prevent this from happen outside the system since B could if necessary
just email F to another user Also since F has been shipped to B B is
now the owner of the shipped le and one could argue that how this le is
further handled is a choice that only B should make
 Conclusion
We have implemented a exible authorization and access control infrastruc
ture for FR where delegations might take place outside the system by any
means available to the users Local access control is maintained by use of
ACLs remote access control is done by using capabilities that are valid
atmostonce
There may be occasions where a user wants to share a le and expects
a high amount of writes by the other user Issuing delegation certicates
for each write may be a tad cumbersome in this case especially if the is
suer trusts this acceptor more than other users A more exible solution
could be to use the guaranteed phase in Rivest  instead so that the
delegation certicate would be valid until a specied expiration date As
discussed earlier the tradeo is between convenience no need to generate
new certicates and security potential misuse
Currently FR make no use of any security servers delegation and
identitycerticates propagate oline outside FR This means that FR does
not scale well Work is in progress on designing and implementing a public
key infrastructure PKI which will make use of online security servers
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to past and current collaborators in the Pasta MobyDick
and GDD projects In particular Gunnar Hartvigsen provided valuable
input on an earlier version of this paper

Availability
The FR server can be downloaded from its home page found at
http://www.pasta.cs.uit.no/frserver/
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